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We studied transmission patterns of severe acute res-
piratory syndrome (SARS) among medical students
exposed exclusively to the first SARS patient in the Prince
of Wales Hospital in Hong Kong, before his illness was rec-
ognized. We conducted a retrospective cohort study of 66
medical students who visited the index patient’s ward,
including 16 students with SARS and 50 healthy students.
The risk of contracting SARS was sevenfold greater among
students who definitely visited the index case’s cubicle than
in those who did not (10/27 [41%] versus 1/20 [5%], relative
risk 7.4; 95% confidence interval 1.0 to 53.3). Illness rates
increased directly with proximity of exposure to the index
case. However, four of eight students who were in the
same cubicle, but were not within 1 m of the index case-
patient, contracted SARS. Proximity to the index case-
patient was associated with transmission, which is consis-
tent with droplet spread. Transmission through fomites or
small aerosols cannot be ruled out.
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly
recognized clinical entity associated with infection by
a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (1–4). SARS is charac-
terized by symptoms of fever, chills, headache, and dry
cough, with radiographic evidence of pneumonia in most
patients. The incubation period of SARS is estimated to be
a median of 4 to 6 days (range 2–10 days). SARS is conta-
gious, and person-to-person transmission appears to occur
primarily through contact or respiratory droplets (5).
However, because of the efficient transmission of SARS
observed in some situations (6,7), concerns remain about
the spread of SARS-CoV through other means, including
small aerosols or contact with contaminated environmen-
tal surfaces.
The pandemic of SARS is believed to have originated in
late 2002 in Guangdong Province, China (5). A SARS
patient from this region, who had onset of illness on
February 15, 2003, traveled to Hong Kong and may have
infected several guests at the hotel where he resided during
February 21–22. One of the affected hotel guests was a res-
ident of Hong Kong; on February 24, he exhibited an illness
characterized by fever, cough, runny nose, and malaise. His
symptoms worsened over the next few days, leading to his
hospitalization on March 4 at the Prince of Wales Hospital,
a major teaching hospital of the Chinese University of
Hong Kong. The cause of this patient’s illness was not rec-
ognized until March 10, when secondary cases of SARS
were first reported among healthcare workers; specific
infection control measures were then implemented.
Epidemiologic investigations indicate that this patient
transmitted SARS to 47 healthcare workers on the ward to
which he was admitted; the administration of a bron-
chodilator through a jet nebulizer was widely believed to
have contributed to this dramatic pattern (1). SARS devel-
oped in all but one of the 16 nursing staff members on the
ward and in all 6 ward physicians. The first patient with a
secondary case of SARS, which presumably resulted from
infection by this index patient, was not hospitalized until
March 11. Therefore, the period from March 4 to 10 pro-
vided a risk window during which the factors that affected
transmission of SARS among persons exposed exclusive-
ly to this index patient could be assessed.
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Georgia, USAAlthough several groups of healthcare workers were
exposed to SARS, some groups (e.g., ward nurses and doc-
tors) could not provide useful information because most
were affected by SARS, and other groups (e.g., staff in the
accident and emergency department) could not recall all of
their exposures to the index patient. However, a group of
medical students who visited the ward had limited, well-
defined exposures that could be accurately recalled. These
included 20 third-year medical students who performed a
bedside clinical assessment in the ward on the mornings of
March 6 and 7, supervised by a team of assessors from the
university. Each student was assigned to examine specific
patients in the ward during a 40-minute interval on 1 of the
2 days. The locations (bed numbers) of the patients
assigned to each student were precisely known, as well as
the relative location of these patients to the index SARS
case-patient. In addition to the students who appeared for
the assessments, several other students (mostly fifth-year
students) visited the ward for bedside teaching or clinical
training March 4–10. We analyzed the epidemiologic fea-




We conducted a retrospective cohort study of medical
students who visited the index patient’s ward from March
4 to March 10, 2003. To define the study cohort, all 474
medical students of the university who were in their clini-
cal years (years 3–5) were contacted to inquire whether
they had visited the patient’s ward during this period.
Because the university classes were suspended in response
to the outbreak at the time this investigation was begun,
the students were contacted by electronic mail.
Data Collection
Students who reported visiting the patient’s ward dur-
ing the period were given a detailed questionnaire that
sought information about demographic characteristics, his-
tory of recent illnesses, activities in the ward (including
specific exposure to the index patient), use of personal pro-
tective equipment, and history of travel March 1–10.
Students who contracted SARS were interviewed in the
hospital wards where they were admitted. To facilitate the
recall of exposures to the index patient, a map showing the
location of the index patient on the ward was distributed
with the survey. Survey responses were validated by a fol-
low-up telephone interview or electronic mail communica-
tion. Data provided by students regarding the bed numbers
of patients they examined during their bedside clinical
assessment were cross-checked with the university
records. The medical (including nursing) records of the
index patient and the students who were ill with SARS
were reviewed.
Case Definition
A case of SARS was defined by the presence of fever
(temperature >38°C) and evidence of pneumonia on either
a radiograph or computed tomographic image of the tho-
rax, with or without respiratory symptoms (e.g., cough and
shortness of breath).
Laboratory Studies
Paired serum specimens were obtained during the acute
phase and convalescent phase (day 21 from onset of fever)
of illness from ill students, and single serum samples were
obtained during April 26 to May 3 from students who vis-
ited the ward during March 4 to 10 but did not acquire
SARS. The serum specimens were tested for anti–SARS-
CoV immunoglobulin (Ig) G by indirect immunofluores-
cence, by using SARS-CoV–infected Vero cells fixed in
acetone. A positive test was defined as either seroconver-
sion (>4-fold rise in antibody titer in the paired serum
specimens) or a convalescent-phase antibody titer of
>1:40.
Ventilation Study
Information on the ward ventilation system was first
obtained from the Electrical and Mechanical Services
Department of the hospital. A detailed assessment of the
ventilation system and airflow studies could not be per-
formed at the time of the outbreak because of logistic
constraints. Retrospective on-site inspections and meas-
urements of the ventilation design and air distribution were
carried out on July 17 and July 22. The supply and exhaust
airflow rates were measured by a hood flow rate meter
(APM 150) (TSI Inc., Shoreview, MN) (measurement
range 24–945 L/s with an accuracy of 3%). Air velocity, air
temperature, and relative humidity at all supply diffusers
and exhaust grilles were measured by a portable VELOCI-
CALC Plus air velocity meter Model 8386A (TSI Inc.).
Information on the location and opening sizes of supply
diffusers and exhaust grilles, as well as information on the
distribution of heat sources such as lighting and the num-
ber of persons in the ward, were also collected during the
site visits.
Data Analysis
Epidemiologic data were entered into a predesigned
database and analyzed by using SAS Version 6.12 software
(SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC). Attack rates among persons
with and without specific exposures were calculated.
Dose-response relationships were also evaluated with
respect to the proximity to the index patient and duration
of these exposures. 
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heat sources were analyzed by computational fluid dynam-
ics (CFD) simulations. The industry standard CFD pack-
age, Fluent, (Fluent USA, Lebanon, NH) was used to pre-
dict (reproduce) the average airflow pattern in the ward
during the outbreak, taking into consideration the effect of
thermal buoyancy.
Results
Clinical Course of the Index Patient’s Illness
On February 24, the index case-patient had onset of an
illness characterized by fever, cough, runny nose, and
malaise. His symptoms worsened over the next few days,
and he sought treatment at the Accident and Emergency
Department of the Prince of Wales Hospital on February
27, when he was treated as an outpatient and discharged.
He visited the Accident and Emergency Department again
on March 4 with the same symptoms and was admitted to
a general medical ward. His fever (range 38°C–40°C) did
not diminish after he received various antimicrobial drugs
and persisted until March 11, when it gradually subsided.
His cough was frequent, low-pitched, and unproductive,
with occasional scanty, whitish sputum, and it persisted
from March 4 to March 13; the cough was most severe
during the first 4 days of his hospitalization, March 4–7.
His chest radiograph on admission showed consolidation
of the right upper lobe and patchy haziness in the right
lower zone. He was weak, was given an intravenous drip,
and remained bedridden during his first week of hospital-
ization. To relieve his respiratory symptoms, he was
administered salbutamol through a jet nebulizer four times
per day (at 10 a.m., 2 p.m., 6 p.m., and 10 p.m.) starting
from 2 p.m. on March 6 until March 12, lasting about 30
min each time. His arterial oxygen on admission was 99%;
it dropped to 95% on March 6, and gradually returned to
98% on March 12. He was identified as the index patient
for the outbreak of SARS in Prince of Wales Hospital on
March 12 and was transferred to an isolation room within
the ward. He remained in isolation for 17 days after his
symptoms subsided and was discharged on March 30. The
patient was not treated with either ribavirin or steroids.
Medical Student Study
Of the 474 medical students, 334 (70.5%) responded to
the survey. Of the 334 respondents, 66 (20%) reported vis-
iting the index patient’s ward during the study period.
Respondents and nonrespondents did not differ in age and
gender. SARS did not develop in any of the nonrespon-
dents or in any of the respondents who did not visit the
index patient’s ward. A detailed survey to assess illness
and exposures was completed by these 66 students, which
included the group of 20 third-year medical students who
performed a bedside clinical assessment, supervised by a
team of assessors from the university, in the ward on
March 6 and 7, and 46 other students who visited the ward
for clinical training on one or more occasions from March
4 to 10. None of the 20 students who appeared for the bed-
side clinical assessment visited this ward after March 7 or
had any contact with other SARS patients in this hospital
or in the community. 
Sixteen (24%) of the 66 students reported an illness that
met the case definition for SARS. Their mean age was 22.3
years, and 8 (50%) were male. The mean age of the 50
other students who visited the ward but did not acquire
SARS was 23.2 years, and 23 (46%) were male. The most
common symptoms of illness among the patients included
fever (100%), chills or rigors (94%), and headache (75%);
cough and shortness of breath were reported by 38% and
33% of patients, respectively (Figure 1). All ill students
were hospitalized, and one required mechanical ventilation
and treatment in the intensive care unit; all recovered from
the illness. The characteristics of the illness among the stu-
dents were similar to those among healthcare workers pre-
sumably infected by the index patient.
Paired serum specimens were collected from 15 of the
16 students during their illnesses, and all had demonstrable
IgG antibodies to SARS-CoV at a titer of >1:40 in the con-
valescent-phase serum. The antibody titer ranged from
1:80 to 1:1,280, with a geometric mean titer of 1:440.
Antibodies to SARS-CoV were absent in the serum speci-
mens obtained from all 50 healthy students. 
The dates of onset of illness of the 16 students with
SARS and the dates they visited the ward are shown in
Figure 2. The student with an unusually long incubation
period of 16 days visited the ward (for a 40-minute bedside
clinical assessment) on March 7. On March 13, she was
noted to have pneumonic changes on a chest radiograph,
although she had no  symptoms. She was admitted to an
observation ward for suspected SARS patients (different
from the index patient’s ward) and was discharged on
March 17 after resolution of her chest radiographic abnor-
malities. On March 23, fever developed, and she was
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Figure 1. Distribution of initial symptoms in 16 students.readmitted as a potential SARS case-patient. Because we
were not certain if this student had been infected during
her initial exposure to the index case or during her subse-
quent hospitalization by exposure to another SARS patient
in the observation ward, we excluded this student from the
analyses of risk exposures. To obtain a precise estimate of
the incubation period of SARS, we examined the onset of
illness among 11 of the 16 ill students who visited the ward
only on a single day, excluding the student with an incuba-
tion of 16 days. Among these 11 patients, the median incu-
bation period was 3 days (range 2–6 days). Figure 3 shows
the incubation period by onset date. Students exposed on
March 6 had the widest range of incubation period (2–6
days). Too few students were exposed exclusively on other
days to show any pattern.
We examined the attack rates of the illness among stu-
dents based on whether they could recall entering the index
patient’s cubicle, a semi-enclosed section of the ward con-
taining 10 beds (Table 1). SARS developed in 10 of the 27
students who reported entering this cubicle, compared with
SARS developing in 4 of the 18 students who could not
accurately recall whether they entered the patient’s cubi-
cle, and in only 1 of 20 students who reported that they
never entered the cubicle (Mantel-Haenszel chi-square =
6.54; p = 0.011; Fisher exact test [2-tailed], p = 0.032). The
student who did not enter the index patient’s cubicle but
acquired SARS was a fifth-year student (not one of the
third-year students who underwent the bedside clinical
assessment) who reported visiting the patient in bed no.
17x, which was located in the opposite cubicle adjacent to
the corridor (Figure 4). Among those students who could
recall accurately whether they entered the patient’s cubi-
cle, entering the cubicle was significantly associated with
illness (10/27 versus 1/20, relative risk = 7.4, 95% confi-
dence interval = 1.0 to 53.3, p = 0.046). The duration the
students stayed in the ward was not associated with the risk
for illness (mean length of stay: 67 minutes for the ill stu-
dents; 80 minutes for the healthy students; p = 0.6).
To further assess the proximity of exposure associated
with illness, we analyzed data from 19 of 20 medical stu-
dents (excluding the ill student who had an unusually long
incubation period) who appeared for the bedside clinical
assessment (lasting 40 minutes for each student) on March
6 or 7. SARS developed in 7 of these 19 students. None of
the students examined the index patient. All three students
who examined patients located in beds within 1 m of the
index patient contracted SARS; four of eight students who
examined patients located in the same cubicle but in beds
>1 m from the index patient contracted SARS, but none of
eight student who examined patients in other cubicles fell
ill (Mantel-Haenszel chi-square = 9.86, p = 0.002; Fisher
exact test [2-tailed], p = 0.0031) (Table 2; Figure 4).
As mentioned previously, the index patient was admin-
istered nebulizer therapy four times per day starting from
2 p.m. on March 6 until March 12, lasting about 30 min-
utes each time. Among all the students, no significant asso-
ciation was noted between their risk for illness and pres-
ence in the ward when the nebulizer was in use. To further
study the potential role of nebulizer therapy in disease
transmission, we studied the temporal patterns of illness
among these 19 students who appeared for a bedside clin-
ical assessment, excluding the student with a long incuba-
tion period (Table 3). Six out of 10 students assessed on
March 6 before the nebulizer was used contracted SARS
compared with 1 out of 9 students on March 7. The time of
assessment of the student with SARS (on March 7) coin-
cided with the use of the nebulizer.
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Figure 2. Dates of onset of illness of 16 students with severe acute
respiratory syndrome and date of their visit to the index patient’s
hospital ward. An asterisk indicates the dates of the visit in March
2003.
Table 1. Attack rate of students by history of visit to index 
patient’s cubicle in the ward 
Entered index  




Yes  10  17  27  37.0 
Not sure  4  14  18  22.2 
No  1  19  20  5.0 
Total  15  50  65  23.1 
aFisher exact test (2-tailed), p = 0.032; Mantel-Haenszel chi-square = 6.54; p = 
0.011. 
Figure 3. Incubation period by onset dates in 11 students.The medical students were assessed by a total of 11
assessors. Five assessors evaluated students on March 6
only, five on March 7 only, and one was present on both
days. SARS was reported by all five assessors for March 6
only, by three of five assessors for March 7 only, and by
the one assessor who was present on both days. 
None of the students had traveled to mainland China,
the only location with suspected community transmission
of SARS during the study period. None of the ill students
reported contact with another ill student or other person
with SARS in the 10 days before illness onset. None wore
masks or gloves while examining patients, and no notable
differences in risk for disease were observed among stu-
dents who reported washing their hands before and after
examining patients. Apart from one hepatitis B carrier
(who contracted SARS), no other students had any chron-
ic illness. The clinical course and severity of illness in the




The hospital is centrally air-conditioned. Fresh air is
drawn from outside the hospital building into a primary air
unit situated in a room adjacent to the ward, where it is
cooled by chilled water and then supplied to this ward (and
another ward on the opposite side of the hospital) through
air ducts. The air is then distributed to five fan-coil units
(one in each of the four cubicles and one at the nurses’sta-
tion), where it is mixed with recirculated air, cooled by
chilled water, and blown into the cubicle/nurses’ station
via air supply diffusers (0.6 m by 0.6 m) located at the cen-
ter of the cubicle in the false ceiling and over the nurses’
station. An exhaust grille, a rectangular opening 0.3 m by
0.6 m, located in the false ceiling in the corridor outside
each cubicle and outside the nurses’ station, recirculates
70% of the air supply back into the fan-coil unit. Excess air
escapes through two extraction fans inside the toilet, two
extraction fans in the store/cleaning room, and through the
door of the ward to the outside. 
Airflow Measurements
The air exchange was  7.79 air changes per hour for the
whole ward. The supply and exhaust airflow rates are sum-
marized in Figure 5. The total air supply was higher than
the total exhaust, which meant that the ward was at a pos-
itive pressure. Our on-site measurement showed that most
of the extra air supply should have exited through the ward
entrance because an exhaust fan was located in both the
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Figure 4. Floor plan of index patient’s hospi-
tal ward. Numbers with and without a suffix
indicate the bed numbers of patients. The
bed of the index patient is shaded. 0, stu-
dents assigned to examine the patient in this
bed who became ill with severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome; x, students assigned to
examine the patient in this bed who
remained healthy.
Table 2. Attack rate for students attending a bedside clinical 
assessment in the ward in relation to their proximity to the index 
patient’s bed
a,b 
Location of exposure  
Cases/no. of 
students exposed 
Bed nos. 10 and 12 (adjacent to index patient)  3/3 
Bed nos. 9, 9x, and 13–16x (beds in the same 
cubicle except bed nos. 10–12) 
4/8 
Other beds in the ward (not in the cubicle)  0/8 
aThe index patient was not used as an assessment case. 
bMantel Haenszel chi-square = 9.86, p=0.002; Fisher exact test (2-tailed), p = 
0.0031. 
Table 3. Time schedule of the clinical assessment of 19 medical 
students
a 
Time   Ill/total 
6 March 2003  10:00–10:40 a.m.  0/3 
  10:40–11:20 a.m.  2/3 
  11:30 a.m.–12:00 p.m.  3/3 
  12:00–12:40 p.m.  1/1 
7 March 2003  10:00–10:40 a.m.  1/2 
  10:40–11:20 a.m.  0/3 
  11:30 a.m.–12:00 p.m.  0/3 
  12:00–12:40 p.m.  0/1 
aExcluding the student-patient whose illness had a long incubation period. primary air unit room and the kitchen, just outside the
entrance to the ward; these fans would create negative
pressure.
The supply and exhaust airflow rates through diffusers
and exhaust grilles were found to be imbalanced. The
exhaust and air supply for the nursing station did not func-
tion properly. The air supply from the diffuser in the index
patient’s cubicle had the highest supply flow rate (336
L/s), while the adjacent exhaust grille had the lowest
exhaust flow rate (87 L/s) among all four functional
exhaust grilles. 
Modeling the Dispersion of Hypothetical Aerosols
At the time of the outbreak (March 4–10), the weather
in Hong Kong was moderate with an ambient temperature
ranging from 10.5°C to 22.3°C. The heat gains in the ward
should be mainly from people, lighting, and equipment. In
our computational fluid dynamics simulations to repro-
duce the average airflow pattern in the ward during the
outbreak, we excluded the washroom and storeroom in our
computational domain; and the exhaust flows through the
two rooms were modeled as exhaust flows through their
doorways. A free boundary condition was imposed on the
ward entrance. Our computational fluid dynamics package
could also consider the movement and evaporation of the
aerosols. We found that aerosols would rapidly evaporate
and the size of droplets would decrease rapidly after they
originated from the index patient’s bed. The average air
speed in the room was around 0.2 m/s. The normalized
concentration contours of hypothetical aerosols are shown
in Figure 6. The concentrations decreased as we moved
away from the index patient’s bed. We also predicted a
fairly high concentration profiles for beds 17x and 24x in
the opposite cubicle. The concentrations in other two cubi-
cles were almost zero. 
Discussion
We utilized a unique opportunity provided by an unrec-
ognized SARS patient who was the only known source of
infection for a large cluster of secondary cases in an insti-
tutional setting to examine the transmission patterns of this
novel disease. Proximity to the index case was associated
with transmission, and all three students who examined the
patient in bed 12 (within 1 m of the index patient) contract-
ed SARS. As the index patient was bedridden during this
period, this observation is compatible with transmission by
droplets. However, that a few ill students were never with-
in 1 m of the index patient raises the possibility of trans-
mission by other mechanisms. Spread by contaminated
fomites is a possibility, especially in light of recent data
indicating that SARS-CoV survives well in the environ-
ment (8). Although none of the students reported direct
contact with any of the index patient’s belongings or linen,
contact with other articles in the ward contaminated by the
274 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 10, No. 2, February 2004
EMERGENCE OF SARS
Figure 6. Dispersion of hypothetical aerosols that originated from
the index patient's bed in the ward. Three levels of normalized
concentrations are shown (0.03, 0.015, and 0.005) because the
source strength of the virus-laden aerosols is unknown.
Figure 5. Airflow rates (L/s) through all air supply
diffusers and exhaust grilles in the index patient’s
hospital ward.  patient’s secretions or body fluids might have occurred.
Transmission by aerosols over a limited distance could
also explain the observed distribution of cases and the
large number of cases among healthcare workers on the
ward. In our ventilation study, we found that the airflow
rate was highest in the air supply diffuser in the index
patient’s cubicle and lowest in the corresponding exhaust
grille. This imbalance and the computed concentration
contours of aerosols (which match our epidemiologic data)
are compatible with spread by aerosols. However, because
we were not able to conduct a detailed study of ventilation
patterns or conduct environmental and air sampling at the
height of the outbreak due to logistic constraints, we can-
not definitively assess whether either fomites or aerosols
played a role in transmitting virus from the index patient.
At the time this investigation was begun, jet nebulizer
therapy given to the index patient was widely believed to
have facilitated transmission. However, our findings
demonstrate efficient transmission even before nebulizer
therapy was begun on the afternoon of March 6. First, 6 of
the 10 students who attended the bedside clinical assess-
ment on the morning of March 6 contracted SARS, com-
pared with 1 of the 9 who attended the assessment on
March 7. Second, all five of the assessors who assessed
students on March 6 alone became ill, compared with three
of the five assessors who were present on March 7 alone.
Lastly, for the students with SARS who were present on
the ward for reasons other than the bedside assessment, no
association was observed between their stay in the ward at
the specific periods when the nebulizer was used and the
development of SARS. However, because nebulizer thera-
py could theoretically exacerbate symptoms of coughing
in SARS patients, we recommend avoiding the use of neb-
ulized medications and other potential aerosol-generating
patient-care procedures if possible and using appropriate
infection control precautions if such procedures are
deemed necessary (9).
Similar large “superspreading events” of SARS associ-
ated with a single patient have been described in several
countries (5,6), which contrast with the limited secondary
spread seen with most SARS patients. Because many of
the index patients in these clusters were infected with early
cases of SARS in their respective countries, such as the
index patient for this outbreak, or had subtle or atypical
manifestations, the failure to recognize the disease early
and institute appropriate infection control precautions
might have contributed to extensive transmission. Also,
some SARS patients may be intrinsically more contagious.
They might excrete greater amounts of virus in their secre-
tions or transmit virus by different routes, which may be
related to specific host (e.g., altered immune status, under-
lying diseases), agent (e.g., coinfections with other
pathogens), or environmental factors that require further
study. Superspreading events have been reported in out-
breaks of other diseases such as Ebola hemorrhagic fever,
rubella, and β-hemolytic streptococci (10–12). While the
mechanisms for these phenomena are largely unknown,
possible explanations include a larger number of contacts
of these superspreaders, inherent differences in the virus-
host relationship, or the presence of a more virulent strain
or higher levels of virus shedding (10). Similarly, hospitals
have previously been documented as settings for efficient
transmission of illnesses such as Lassa fever and Bolivian
hemorrhagic fever (13,14). 
In conclusion, this cluster demonstrates the potential for
widespread nosocomial spread of SARS among a previous-
ly healthy population in the absence of specific infection
control precautions. SARS is likely spread through direct
contact and respiratory droplets in most instances, and oth-
ers have demonstrated that specific infection control pre-
cautions to prevent transmission by these mechanisms are
effective (15). However, we cannot exclude the role of con-
taminated fomites or small aerosols in transmitting virus in
this outbreak. Whether this large cluster resulted from
different mechanisms of transmission, greater viral shed-
ding by the patient, or inadequate infection-control meas-
ures is not known, but it clearly indicates that SARS can be
spread highly efficiently in some situations. Abetter under-
standing of the phenomenon of superspreading events,
including clusters with apparently unique patterns (15), is
key to assessing the pandemic potential of SARS and the
effectiveness of control measures (16,17). 
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